. -, -------_ _ _ _ _ _ _ .... !-=-, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .~ .>If,i'''~,~j ',,'"''''' Evidence supported probate court's order terminating minor child's paternal grandmother's guardianship of child and awarding his custody to his mother on grounds that guardianship was no longer necessary. that mother was proper person for chi1d~s custody, and that award of custody to her was for child's best interest.
Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8.
Guardian and ward c1P25
The District Court of Appeal, on appeal from probate court's order terminating minor child's paternal grandmother's guardianship of child and awarding his custody to his mother, is bound by probate court's fIndings on conflicting evidence as to mother's fitness for child's custody. Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8. 3 . Guardian and ward ¢:::>25 statute to remove guardian and appoint another guardian for any of causes mentioned therein. Probate Code, § 1580, subd.8. 6 . Guardian and ward ~25 On mother's petition for termination of her minor son's guardianship by his paternal grandmother On ground that guardianship was no longer necessary and for award of child's custody to petitioner on ground of child's welfare, probate court retained authority to determine what was for child's best interest and to. award his custody accordingly. Probate Code, § 1580, subd.8. 7 . Guardian and ward ¢:::>25 A court having jurisdiction to grant letters of guardianship has jurisdiction to revoke them. Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8.
Guardian and ward ~25
A probate court, appointing guardian of minor child's person and estate, retains continuing supervisory jurisdiction over estate's affairs and guardian's handling thereof, and removal of guardian for stattrtory reasons rests within jSuch court's broad discretion. Probate Code, § IS80, subd. 8.
When guardianship of minor child is 9. Guardian and ward ~29 no longer necessary, probate court, on peti-A parent or other relative of minor tion of child's parent for termination of child under guardian's control may seek guardianship, with adequate proof of peti-child's custody by petition. tioner's fitness for child's custOdy and best interest of child, may' a ward custody to such parent in exercise of sound discretion, and District Court of Appeal may not interfere with such determination, in absence of abuse of discretion. Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8.
Parent and child c1P2(4)
When minor child's custody is awarded to one of its parents, probate court need not find that 'other parent is unfit for child's custody, but parent's unfitness must be determined only when child's custody is awarded to another than one of its parents.
Guardian and ward ~5, 27
The probate court, which originaIly granted letters of guardianship of minor child's person and estate, is authorized by
Guardian and ward <8=>25
A probate court, which originally granted letters of guardianship of minor child's person and estate, retained jurisdiction to terminate guardianship as no longer necessary and to award child's custody to his mother on her petition. Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8.
II. Guardian and ward ~25
The statute providing that minor ward's marriage or attainment of majority terminates guardianship. where guardian was appointed solely because of ward's minority, and that, in all other cases, guardianship is terminated only by court's order on guardian's or ward's application after notice to the other, is inapplicable to removal of guardian on petition of minor ward's par- 
THOMPSON, Justice.
The paternal grandmother of David Theodore White, Jr., was appointed" guardian of the person and estate of said minor child, who was two and a half years of age. Upon subsequent petition of the mother of the child, which was served on both the guardian and the father of the 'Child, the probate court terminated the guardianship, under Section 1580, subdivision 8, of the Probate ,Code, and awarded his custody to his mother. ,From that order both the guardian and the father have appealed.
The appellants contend that the order is not supported by the evidence, that the court was without jurisdiction to terminate the guardianship, or to award the custody of the child to the mother without specifically finding that the father was not a fit or proper person to assume his custody. child had no estate. The allowance was insufficient for their maintenance, and the mother was therefore required to accept employment. She was then living in Sacramento. To provide for care' of the child while the mother was working she consented to the appointment of the petitioner, Thelma V. White, the paternal grandmother, as guardian of the person and estate of the minor ehild. The petition to terminate the guardianship of David and to recover his custody was filed .by his mother, _Zelma. in Sacramento, July 11, 1946. Process was served on both the guardian and Mr. White, who appeared; answered the petition and participated in the hearing which occurred Octo:-ber 30, 1946. Both opposed the petition and testified as witnesses at the hearing. Mr. White did not ask for the personal custody of the child.
The court adopted findings favorable to the petitioner in accordance with the foregoing statement of facts, determining: That Zelma, the mother of the child David, consented to the granting of letters of guardilUl-468 Cal.
191 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES ship of the child on account of the necessity then existing that she was obliged to accept employment to aid in the maintenance of herself and said minor; that said necessity for a guardian no longer exists; that Zelma and her present husband, Mr. Mitcham, are now living together in their home and are desirous of having the custody and control of the child j that, despite her previous conduct, the mother, Zelma, is a fit and proper person to have the custody, care and control of the minor chHd; and that it is for the best interest of the child that his mother, Zelma, should assume his custody and control.
The court thereupon ordered that the letters of guardianship of the person and estate of the minor child, David, be re .. "oked and terminated. and that he be awarded to the custody and control of his mother, Zelma Maxine Mitcham. with the privilege granted to his father to visit him at all reasonable times and places. A motion for new trial was denied. From the order terminating the guardianship and awarding the child to the mother, both the guardian and Mr. White, the father of the child, have appealed.
[1,2) We are of the opinion the findings and order terminating the guardianship and awarding the custody of the child to his mother are adequately supported by the evidence. The probate court determined (hat guardianship of the child was no longer necessary, that the mother was a fit and proper person, to assume his custody, and that it was for the best interest of the child to award him to her custody. The fitness of the mother and the welfare of the child were direct issues in this proceeding. The father opposed the awarding of custody to Zelma, but made no application for the child's custody in his own behalf. We assume that the ,father ·was entirely fit and proper. While the evidence is conflicting regarding the fitness of the mother, we are bound by the findings of the court in that respect. We are satisfied the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it is for the best interest of the child in awarding him to the custody of the mother.
[3) When it appears that the guardianship of a minor child is no longer necessary, In the Riley case, supra, under circumstances similar to those of the present pro--ceeding, an order terminating the guardianship On the ground that "it is no longer necessary" and awarding the custody of the minor to her mother, who had previously consented to the guardianship, was affirmed on appeal. Regarding the discretion of the probate court to make that order, it is said, 72 CaI.App.2d at page 747, 165 P.2d at page 557: "Since the probate court retains continuing supervisory jurisdiction over guardianship matters, the removal of a guardian for any of the reasons specified in the code, Prob.Code, § 1580, rests within the broad discretion of the court, and where, as in the instant case, the court found that the mother was a fit and proper person and concluded that the guardianship was no longer necessary, the COllrt properly re .. moved the guardian and restored the custody of the child to her mother."
[4) When the application for custody of a minor child is awarded to one of the parents, it is not necessary to find that the other parent is unfit for its custody. The unfitness of a parent of a minor child is required to be determined only when its custody is awarded to one other than its parents. Stever v. Stever, supra.
[5] The probate court which originally grants letters of guardianship is authorized under Section 1580 of the Probate Code to remove the guardian of the person and estate of a minor child and to appoint another person in his place, for any of the causes [&) In !he presen\ case the mother's petition was not only based on the ground that the guardianship f'is no longer necessary" ~ but it also asked for the custody of the minor child on the ground of its welfare. The fitness of the mother and the welfare of the infant child were the chief issues in this case. The probate court retained authority, upon that petition, to determine what was for the best interest of the child, and to award its custody accordingly.
[7] In 39 Corpus Juris Secundum, Guardian and Ward, § SOd, it is said: liThe court.paving jurisdiction t9 gfan~ letter~ of guardianship has jurisdiction' to re~oke them."
[8] In !he matter at !he Guardianship of Russel, supra, 21 Cal.2d a·t page.7?2,. 135 P.2d at page 371, the Supreme Court said: "The Probate Court retaiQs a continuing, ~upervisory jurisdiction pver the affairs. of the estate and the guardian's handling thereof.' ~nd the removal of a guardian for the reasons specified in the code rests within the broad discred.9n of that court.'"
[9] And in 39 Corpus Juris Secundum, Guardia:n and Ward, § 57, it is said: "The parent or other relative may by petition seek the eusfody of the ward,' where the guardian has contro1."
In the matteraf the Guardianship of Case, supra, the essential facts aTe similar to those of the present case. In that proceeding, as the issue of the marriage of Mr. and Mrs.
Case, a child nainedLouis was horn in 1935. The mother died. 'The maternal grandmother took possession of the child and was appointed 'guardian of the person and estate in 1937. The father: was' then serving in the United States Navy. He returned to his home in 1940 and'laier filed a petition in the g'Uardianship matte',,; asking the probate tourt to discharge the guardian, under Sec· tion 1580 of !he ProhateCode, on the ground that 'lJ"t is no longer necessary to have a guardian," and also asked the court to a ward to him the custody. of the minor child. The application was contested by the grandmother. The court found that Uthe welfare of the minoT ,will best be served by terminating the guan,lianship and restoring the child!o his father," [57 Cal.App.Zd 844, 135 P.2d &8Z] The father was found to be a fit and proper person. ,That order was made. The guardian appealed. On appeal the court said : .. "Wb'cit the appointment of a guardian for a m~nor of tender years is found to be necessary, such appointment is a duty of the, Supetior, Court. When it ;,lppears.to the co~rt,lhat a,guardianship is no longer necessary for such ward the court must thereupon remrive' the guardian. § , 1580, subd. 8, Pr.ob.Code. Inasmuch as a natural parent has s~pt"dor right to the eus· tody of his child wh'm possessed of such character as to mak~ him a fit custodian ~ereof,., t1i.e,~~a.son ipr the.~ardianship of the minor ceases anq Jts continuance is improper. In re Santos ' Estate, 185 Cal. 127, 132, 195 P. 1055 . $i~ce!he father is competent and has therefore the preferential right to have the cus~6dy of his child, even 'I, .
[10] ,We conclull. that the Probate Court, which origin.,!l,. granted the letters of guardianship of t~,e:person and estate· of the minor child. -ret~~ed jurisdiction upon this petition to term~nate the guardianship on the ground that i~ ;was no longer neees--sary, and to award !he custody of !he ehild to his mother.
i:
[11] The appell..ntscoittend that' 'the court was 'without 'jurisdiction to terminate the guardianship except upon "application
191 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES of the guardian or the ward." (Prob.Code, ~ec. 1590.) That section provides: "( 1) Where the appointment of a guard-;an was made solely because of the ward's minority, the marriage of a minor ward terminates the guardianship of the person; and the guardianship of the estate of a minor female ward is terminated upon her attaining majority as provided in Section 25 of the Civil Code.
" (Z) If the appointment of a guardian is made solely because of the ward's minority, the guardianship is terminated by his attaining majority.
" ( 3) In all other eases the guardianship is terminated only by order of the court upon application of the guardian or the ward, .fter such notice to the other as the court or judge may require." (Italics added.) \Ve think the foregoing section has no application to the removal of a guardian, upon petition of a parent of a minor child on the grounds specified in Section 1580 of the Probate Code, or for the custody of the &::hiid by said parent. Section 1590 appar ..
(,ntly contemp1ates only the termination of a guardianship of a minor when the ward obtains the age of majority or has married, in either of which events, the application for termination would naturally be made by ~he guardian or the ward. That construe· tion is apparent, for the last subdivision of I..hat section provides that, under such circ;umstances, the order may be made only "after such notice to the other." The section makes no reference to the awarding of the custody of a minor to his parents on the ground that it is for its best interest, or otherwise. Naturally, the parties most interested in the welfare of a minor, who is to be relieved of its guardianship, are the parents. The termination of guardianship on the ground that the ward has attained majority or has married is not induded in Section 1580. Section 1590 is confined to the termination of guardianships on the grounds mentioned therein. In the event of the subsequent marriage of a ward, or the attaining of majority, whether he be a male or a female, it is apparent that both the guardian and the ward would then be qualified to apply for a termination of the guardianship upon giving "notice to the other." But when the gist of the application is for custody of an infant by a parent, for the best interest and welfare of the child, under such circumstances as exist in this case, the limited notice specified by Section 1590, to the guardian Or ward only, would be utterly inadequate since the other parent, if living, would be entitled to notice of that proceeding. We conclude that the provisions of Section 1590, with respect to the parties who may petition for termination of a guardianship, and the notice there required, has no application to Section 1580, or to a petition for custody of an infant minor.
The order terminating the guardianship and awarding the custody of the minor child, David Theodore White, Jr., to his mother, Zelma Ma."{ine Mitcham, is affirmed. ADAMS, P. J., and SCHOTTKY, J. pro tern., concur. 
I. Judgment ~93
Final judgment on the merits in actio}, by husband for his injuries sustained in automobile collision was res judicata of is~ SUes of subsequent action by wife for her injuries and for special damages sustained in the same collision, and estopped wife from maintaining such action, since issues were identical, and since wife, although not named as a party plaintiff in husband's action, was in privity with husband because of her community interest in his cause of action, and because, if wife recovered, husband would profit to extent of his community interest in the judgment, notwithstanding determination against him On the merits. Code Civ.Proc. § § 370, 378, 3R2. 1908. 1910 ; Civ.Code, ~ 164.
' " Subsequent opinion 202 P.2d 73.
